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Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation
Mostapha Diss∗and Eric Kamwa†
Social choice theory provides a theoretical framework for analyzing
how to combine individual opinions, preferences, interests or welfare
so as to reach a collective decision. Social choice theory is one of the ar-
eas in economics that has seen a boom in simulations work usingmod-
els based on the behavior of individuals involved in collective decision-
making. The purpose of this paper is to offer to the uninitiated reader
a methodological presentation of these different models, as well as the
techniques for theoretical calculations and simulations, and then to re-
port on recent developments concerning new models and advances in
calculation techniques and simulations. This paperwill thus give read-
ers easy access to the models which, due to their complexity, might
seem to be reserved for initiates. We take the opportunity to present
and discuss the assumptions that support each of the models, and in-
dicate how simulations may be helpful in analyzing complex problems
in social choice theory.
Keywords: social choice, voting, preference aggregation, simulations,
models
Simulations dans les modèles d’agrégation des préférences
La théorie du choix social offre un cadre théorique pour analyser com-
ment combiner des opinions, des préférences, des intérêts ou bien-être
individuels afin de prendre une décision collective. La théorie du choix
social est l’un des domaines de l’économie qui a connu un essor des
travaux autour des simulations à partir de modèles basés sur le com-
portement des individus impliqués dans la prise de décision collective.
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L’objectif de cet article est d’offrir au lecteur non initié une présen-
tation méthodologique de ces différents modèles, ainsi que des tech-
niques de calculs théoriques et de simulations, puis de rendre compte
des développements récents concernant les nouveaux modèles et des
avancées en matière de techniques de calcul et de simulations. Cet ar-
ticle donnera ainsi aux lecteurs un accès facile aux modèles qui, en rai-
son de leur complexité, peuvent sembler réservés aux initiés. Nous en
profitons pour présenter et discuter des hypothèses qui sous-tendent
chacun des modèles et indiquer comment les simulations peuvent être
utiles pour analyser des problèmes complexes de la théorie du choix
social.
Mots-clés: choix social, vote, agrégation des préférences, simulations,
modèles
JEL: B41, C15, C18, C63, D71, D72
Over the past few decades, social choice theory has been one of the areas
in economics that has seen a boom in work using models based on the be-
havior of individuals involved in collective decision-making. Thesemodels
have helped in designing renowned and robust results in the field of prefer-
ence aggregation. The frameworks developed on the basis of these models
made it possible, by theoretical and/or computer simulations, to validate
or invalidate several analytical results established in the literature. The aim
of this paper is to offer, to the uninitiated, a methodological presentation of
these different models, as well as the associated techniques of theoretical
calculations and simulations, and then to report on recent developments
concerning new models and advances in calculation techniques and simu-
lations.
Computer simulations emerged in social choice theory almost at the
same time as in political science. From the late sixties onwards, more and
more researchers turned to computer simulations to study the behavior of
agents involved in collective decision-making processes. This method of
analysis differs from those that have traditionally prevailed. This new ap-
proach mainly relies on the use of statistical tools to model behaviours, as
well as the use of empirical analyses on real databases (results of elections,
referenda or public consultations, etc.) or data collected through opinion
polls or surveys.
We could actually argue that a large literature using computer simula-
tions in social choice theory is devoted to the evaluation of voting systems
according to different normative criteria, in order to obtain a hierarchy of
the voting rules under investigation. Basically, this literature can be divided
into two main categories:
1. Research that aims to compare various voting rules on the basis of
their ability to lead to some desirable voting outcomes. The selec-
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tion of the Condorcet winner, when he/she exists, is one of these de-
sirable voting outcomes. Indeed, there is a large literature in social
choice theory devoted exclusively to the Condorcet efficiency1 of vot-
ing rules. The question of the concordance between voting rules2 has
also been widely studied in this literature. Naturally, there are a vari-
ety of other considerations that go into this category.
2. Much of the research in social choice theory is concernedwithwhether
a paradox can occur for a given voting rule or not. We define a voting
paradox as an undesirable outcome to which a ballot can lead un-
der a given voting rule and which may be regarded as surprising or
counterintuitive. Many voting paradoxes has been the focus of nu-
merous investigations in the literature: Condorcet’s paradox, Borda’s
paradoxes, referendum paradox, monotonicity paradoxes, suscepti-
bility to strategic manipulation, etc. This list of examples is of course
a partial one, but they all clearly demonstrate that the notion of the
probability of voting paradoxes is a central one.
All these questions and many others have been investigated via simula-
tions. For a detailed survey of early research on the two items, the reader
can refer to Felsenthal (2012); Felsenthal and Nurmi (2018); Gehrlein and
Lepelley (2011, 2017); Nurmi (1989, 1999), and Saari (1995), among others.
Throughout this paper, the only illustration considered is the likelihood
of Condorcet’s paradox which is one of the themes that has most mobilized
researchers from both the traditional line and the simulations approach.
This choice can be understood, given the historical and theoretical impor-
tance of this paradox in the social choice literature which has largely been
dominated by studies that are associated with this paradox. According to
this paradox, it is possible, by aggregating the preferences of a group of
individuals who are asked to rank three propositions (let us say A, B, and
C) in order of preference, that a majority of voters prefers A to B, another
majority prefers B to C and another prefers C to A. In such a case, we get
a majority cycle which is the main drawback of the voting rule suggested
by Condorcet (1785) as an alternative to that proposed by Borda (1781). In-
deed, at the end of the 18th century, Borda and Condorcet, both members
of the Paris Royal Academy of Sciences, proposed alternative voting rules
to the one that was in use in the academy. The Borda rule picks as the
winner the candidate with the highest Borda’s score.3 Condorcet criticized
this rule in that it allows the existence of a candidate that is preferred by
more than half of the electorate to the Borda winner; he proposed a rule
based on pairwise comparisons. According to this rule, a candidate should
1 The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the conditional probability that the
procedure select the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists.
2 The analysis is of interest since it allows to know how the choice of the voting rule is
susceptible to impact the determination of the winner.
3 With m candidates, the Borda rule awards m− j points to a candidate each time he/she
is ranked j-th in a voter’s ranking. The total number of points received by a candidate defines
his/her Borda’s score.
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be declared the winner if he/she beats all the other candidates in pairwise
majority; such a candidate is called the Condorcet winner. In the end, the
members of the academy leaned in favor of the Borda rule to the detriment
of the Condorcet rule.
Although the Borda-Condorcet debate concerned only two rules for col-
lective decision-making, it helped lay the groundwork for what can be de-
scribed as “the quest for the best rule for collective decision”: a quest that is
built around the comparison of the merits of different voting rules against
each other. Decision rules can therefore be compared either on the basis of
normative properties which they meet or not (the axiomatic approach), or
on the basis of the frequency with which they satisfy or fail a given crite-
rion (the probabilistic approach). These two ways of proceeding define the
two principal approaches in the studies dealing with social choice theory.
We present the two approaches in Section 1 where we will show that they
complement each other.
The probabilistic approach experienced a boom in the late fifties, which
saw much work on the occurrence of Condorcet’s paradox. One of the
paths taken to evaluate the Condorcet paradox is empirical studies based
on data collected during real decision-making processes, elections, surveys
or polls. For an overview of the work that falls within this framework, the
reader may refer to Chamberlin et al. (1984); Dobra (1983); Dobra and Tul-
lock (1981); Kurrild-Klitgaard (2008, 2001); Niemi (1970); Regenwetter et al.
(2002a,b); Riker (1958, 1965); Taylor (1997) and Tideman (1992). Notice that
the results of these empirical studies are summarized inGehrlein (2006) and
Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011, 2017). However, empirical analyses are not
always possible, because the data for such studies are rarely available, ac-
cessible or even reliable; this may limit the scope of the empirical approach.
The solution to such a limit is the use of probabilistic models describing the
behavior of individuals and then try to find the theoretical probabilities of
voting events according to these models.
The first use of probabilistic models in social choice theory dates back to
the paper by May (1948) who calculated the overall likelihood of the refer-
endum paradox which is the one that occurred, for instance, when Donald
Trump was elected in 2016.4 It deserves to be mentioned that, some years
later, Guilbaud (1952) gives in his important paper the probability of Con-
dorcet’s paradox when three options are in contest. This practice spread in
the late 1960s with the work of Campbell and Tullock (1965); Garman and
Kamien (1968) and Niemi andWeisberg (1968) on the probability of a cycli-
cal majority. For the state of the art on the Condorcet paradox using prob-
abilistic models, the reader can refer to the books of Gehrlein (2006) and
Gehrlein andLepelley (2011, 2017). The use of probabilisticmodels requires
us to make a priori assumptions on the distribution of preferences in order
to build a model describing the behavior of the individuals. We discuss the
main assumptions and models in Section 2. The probabilistic model ap-
4 More precisely, Donald Trump won enough states to secure the majority in the Electoral
College, while Hillary Clinton received 2.87million more votes than Trump.
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proach faces some criticisms, chiefly: i) even with a fairly small number of
candidates in the running, probabilistic models can very quickly become
intractable; ii) the realism of the assumptions underlying most models is
questionable; and iii) the results obtained depend strongly on the hypothe-
sis underlying themodel and can thus vary from one hypothesis to another.
We give a detailed discussion of each of these limitations later in the paper.
As mentioned before, the use of simulations has emerged as a means of
transcending themain limitations of the two traditional approaches of pref-
erence aggregation analysis. In a general sense, simulation is the systemati-
zation and formulation of a model for determining the main characteristics
of a system, a transaction or a process. In the framework of the aggregation
of preferences, simulations mean the construction of a model which tries
to simulate to the best degree possible the behaviours (i.e., preferences) of
the individuals (i.e., voters). The use of simulations in social choice theory
is not as recent as one might think; it was a result of the pioneering work of
Arrow (1951, 1963) that the first results based on simulations appeared (see
for instance, Klahr, 1966; Weisberg and Niemi, 1978, 1973), mainly around
the probability of the Condorcet paradox, in which analytical calculations
were no longer possible due to mathematical limits when the number of
candidates or voters increases. We come back to these different studies later
in the paper, where we take the opportunity to provide a brief history of
simulations in social choice theory and to present the different approaches
adopted as well as review their scope.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First of all, we must fa-
miliarize the reader with the object of social choice theory, namely the ag-
gregation of preferences. Section 1 is therefore dedicated to this end. In
Section 2, we present the main models or hypotheses on which the theo-
retical works are based. Section 3 is devoted to the methods of simulations
that have been developped in contrast to that of the theoretical approach.
A conclusion follows.
1 Aggregation of Individual Preferences
1.1 Preference Aggregation: A Brief History
The aggregation of preferences is at the heart of social choice theory, the
essential purpose of which is to study ways of coherently aggregating indi-
vidual preferences into a collective choice or a collective ranking of candi-
dates. Given a group of individuals, who have to choose between at least
two options (alternatives or candidates), a collective decision procedure,
also called an aggregation rule, associates with each state of nature a col-
lective ranking of options or a subset of winners. This theory leans on fun-
damental microeconomic principles and aims to understand the decision-
making of rational individuals as regards to economic phenomena or be-
yond. According to List (2013), social choice theory is not a single theory
but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individ-
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ual inputs. Indeed, it covers, by its vast field of applications, a multitude of
contextswhere the problem is formally similar: a group of individuals (e.g.,
experts, judges, jury, voters, etc.) who face a set of options (e.g., resource
allocations, economic projects, candidates in a competition or an election,
etc.), must reach a collective decision based on the opinions and interests
of the different members. In other words, the scope and stakes of this the-
ory are, in fact, potentially far-reaching, and may interest, in addition to
economics and politics, areas as diverse as management, psychology, com-
puter science and philosophy. This theory is now a recognized branch of
modern microeconomics.
Historically, since the seminal works of Arrow (1951, 1963), the inter-
est of economists in the question of collective choice has had its source in
the new economy of well-being developed in the 1940s, thanks in particular
to the works of Pigou (1920), Bergson (1938), and Samuelson (1947). The
traditional economy of well-being was for a long time dominated by an al-
most total adherence to the utilitarian approach of Bentham (1789), and set-
tled down, with the work of Edgeworth (1881), Marshall (1960), and Pigou
(1920), in a very different framework from that of social choice theory. It
was only from the late 1940s, with the work of Arrow (1951, 1963), Black
(1948, 1958, 1976), and May (1952, 1971), that the context of the collective
decision has been conjoined with that of the welfare economy, leading to
the birth of the social choice theory in its modern form.
More precisely, in utilitarian calculations, the preferences of individuals
are represented by numerical utility functions defined on all social states,
and judgments on social interest are obtained by maximizing the sum of
individual utilities. This implies that one can measure satisfaction, or hap-
piness, in the form of utilities and that these utilities are comparable be-
tween individuals. This cardinal approach was called into question in the
1930s and finally abandoned in favor of the new welfare economy, which
banned any possibility of interpersonal comparison of individual utilities
and which gave an important place to the criterion of Pareto efficiency. This
criterion tells us that one allocation is preferable to another if it allows an
increase in the level of satisfaction of one or more individuals without re-
ducing the utility of others. This principle proved to be insufficient, how-
ever, since many possible allocations can be Pareto optima. Hence, an eco-
nomic theory of collective choice has become indispensable. The notion
of a collective aggregation function introduced by Arrow (1951, 1963) fits
into this framework insofar as it allows aggregating individual preferences
into a collective preference, so that society can choose between the different
Pareto optima.
1.2 The Axiomatic Approach and the Probabilistic
Approach
Arrow (1951, 1963) showed that inconsistencies related to collective choice
are not a surprise as they affect a verywide class of aggregation procedures.
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The method adopted in Arrow’s theorem is called the axiomatic approach. It
consists of choosing a certain number of properties which seem too reason-
able to impose on the aggregation procedures and then demonstrating that
the satisfaction of these properties all together leads to an inconsistency,
in the sense that such an aggregation procedure does not exist. In other
words, there is no aggregation procedure that allows to verify all the de-
sirable conditions taken into account at the same time. More precisely, the
desirable conditions stated by Arrow are: i) Universal domain: all individ-
ually rational preference orderings are allowed as inputs into the aggrega-
tion method; ii) Completeness and Transitivity: the derived social preference
ordering should be complete and transitive; iii) Unanimity condition (also
called the Pareto principle): when all the voters have the same strict prefer-
ence over a pair of candidates, the social ranking is the same as the voters’
unanimous preference. In other words, if every individual prefers X to Y ,
then the aggregation method should similarly rank X and Y ; iv) Indepen-
dent of Irrelevant Alternatives: the social ranking ofX and Y should depend
only on how individuals rankX and Y and not on how they rank some “ir-
relevant” alternativeW relative toX and Y ; v)Non-imposition: an outcome
is not to be imposed. vi) Non-dictatorship: the aggregation method cannot
be based solely on one individual’s preferences.
By accepting the idea of discarding or weakening some of the Arrow’s
axioms and/or adding others, Arrow’s theorem has given rise to count-
less contributions using his axiomatic method which still is the most com-
mon approach in social choice theory. However, it is important to mention
that themajority of the convincing results using the axiomatic method have
been obtained in the form of impossibility theorems, which highlights the
difficulty of designing a method allowing a reasonable aggregation of the
opinions expressed by individuals in a decision procedure. Moreover, the
most important limitation of the axiomatic approach is that it does not of-
fer information on the frequency of situations where a given aggregation
procedure violates a desirable property/axiom.
The probabilistic approach has been developed in the framework of social
choice theory in order to dealwith this limit of the axiomatic approach. This
approach starts by using models describing the behavior of individuals in-
volved in the aggregation process and then to quantify the probability of
occurrence of certain types of collective outcomes for a given aggregation
rule under the assumption fixed on the distribution of individual prefer-
ences. The most significant part of the research on this topic make use of
sophisticated analytical techniques in order to obtain exact results describ-
ing the theoretical probabilities of the studied voting events. Most of the
models that are widely used in the literature are based on two pioneer as-
sumptions: the Impartial Culture (IC) and the Impartial and Anonymous Cul-
ture (IAC). These models will formally be defined and discussed later. The
IC and IAC assumptions as well as most of the other used models are spe-
cial cases of the multinomial law and one of their limitations lies in the fact
that, even for a limited number of alternatives and individuals, the multi-
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nomial law becomes difficult to manage, except by resorting to numerical
or computer simulations. Indeed, simulations havemade it possible to find
and (in)validate several results established in the social choice literature.
1.3 Individual Preferences
Let N be the set of n ≥ 2 individuals who have to decide on the set A of
m ≥ 3 alternatives.5 In order to decide, each voter must make a judgment
of his/her own on the candidates in the running. This judgment is part of
the process of preference formation which in social choice theory is not the
subject of a study. The preferences are then assumed to be exogenous. In
addition, it is generally assumed that each voter votes sincerely and acts
according to his/her true preferences.
A voting profile consists of a list of each of the individual voter’s iden-
tities along with their respective preference. In other words, a profile is de-
fined as a collection of n individual preferences expressed on the set of can-
didates A. Moreover, a voting situation is an anonymous profile. In other
words, a voting situation is a vector denoting any particular combination of
natural integers that sum to n; each component of this vector denotes the
number of voters associated with the corresponding ranking. For m = 3
and linear/strict orders assumed, Table 1 describes the possible strict rank-
ings on A = {a, b, c}. In this table, it is indicated that n1 voters have the
ranking abc; this means that they rank candidate a at the top followed by
candidate b and candidate c is the least preferred. In this setting, a profile is
a sequence of n linear orders – one for every individual – over the three can-
didates and a voting situation is defined by the vector ñ = (n1, n2, . . . , n6),
where in parentheses, we refer the number of voters endowed with each of
the six orders such that
∑6
i=1 ni = n
Table 1: Possible strict rankings on A = {a, b, c}
n1 : abc n2 : acb n3 : bac
n4 : bca n5 : cab n6 : cba
As it is the case in Table 1, it should be noted that, in most social choice
5 As mentioned before, in order to show the increasing interest for simulations in social
choice theory, our illustrative example is theCondorcet’s paradoxwhich requires that there are
at least three alternatives. However, notice that an entire component of the literature on prob-
ability calculations and simulations in social choice theory is ignored in this paper: the one
that considers the two-alternative case. First, some voting paradoxes can occur with only two
alternatives (e.g., the referendum paradox, see Miller, 2012); second (and most importantly) a
large number of studies deal with the question of voting power, which can be measured as the
probability of being pivotal for a voter, in a two-candidate (voting "yes" or "no") framework.
The two most famous power indices, the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, are
respectively based on IC and IAC. On this topic, see e.g., Straffin (1988) and Le Breton et al.
(2016).
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literature, it is explicitly admitted that the preferences of individuals are
linear orders. This implies that agents cannot be indifferent between two
or more alternatives. Using Monte Carlo simulations, Bjurulf (1972) and
Jones et al. (1995) pointed out that this is not without impact on the re-
sults obtained; they also emphasize that admitting the possibility of having
weak orders rather than strict orders would make preferences more realis-
tic and would greatly reduce the probability of certain events such as the
Condorcet paradox. Analytically, Fishburn andGehrlein (1980) reached the
same conclusion. In a recent book, as part of their work on “Behavioral So-
cial Choice”, Regenwetter et al. (2006) have developed the tools to overcome
the tradition of a priori preferences. In addition to highlighting the different
limits of the traditional approach of social choice theory, they have devel-
oped methodologies to (re)construct preference distributions from incom-
plete data and a statistical sampling and Bayesian inference framework for
the theoretical and empirical analysis of preference aggregation in samples
drawn from practically any distribution over any family of binary relations.
We say more on this in Section 3.
We are now equipped to introduce the main theoretical models used in
social choice theory when dealing with voting events.
2 Simulations Based on Theoretical Models on
Agents’ Behavior
The main purpose of using theoretical assumptions to model the behavior
of a group of individuals is to derive an exact theoretical representation of
the probability of a given event. The starting point in the differentmodels is
to assume an a priori distribution or assumption under which the samples
of the individual preferences are drawn. In this paper, we will only focus
our attention on the most popular and widespread models.
2.1 The Main Theoretical Models
The Impartial Culture Model
The impartial culture (IC) model was introduced for the first time in the so-
cial choice literature by Guilbaud (1952), who was interested in calculating
the probability of the Condorcet paradox. Asmentioned before, this model
is among themost used in the literature, as shown by the large body ofwork
on calculating the probabilities of electoral events produced since the sev-
enties. Under thismodel, it is assumed that all voting profiles have the same
probability of appearing. This means that each individual randomly and
independently chooses his/her preference on the basis of a uniform prob-
ability distribution across all linear (or weak) orders. It follows that, with
linear orders, where each of m! linear orders has the same probability 1m!
of being chosen by an individual, and the probability of attaining a voting
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As mentioned before, it is worth noting that the IC model is only a spe-
cial case of the multinomial law. David and Mallows (1961); Gehrlein and
Fishburn (1978a,b) and Plackett (1954) showed that for an infinite number
of individuals, an application of the central limit theorem allows an ap-
proximation of the multinomial law by a multivariate normal law. Recall
that a multivariate normal distribution is a vector of multiple normally dis-
tributed variables, such that any linear combination of the variables is also
normally distributed.6 The central limit theorem states that averages cal-
culated from independent, identically distributed random variables have
approximately normal distributions, regardless of the type of distribution
fromwhich the variables are sampled, provided it has finite variance. How-
ever, the use of themultinomial law, aswell as its approximation, can quickly
become intractable even with a relatively small number of individuals. The
various probability calculation techniques suggested under the IC model
(e.g., Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1978a,b; Saari and Tataru, 1999) have the dis-
advantage of leading to different formulaswhich are often not compact and
are difficult to handle.
Fishburn and Gehrlein (1980) was the first to introduce an extension
of IC in order to take into account the possible indifference in the agents’
preferences: the impartial weak ordering culture (IWOC). More recently, Diss
et al. (2010) have provided another extension of IC that allows the possibil-
ity for voters to have dichotomous preferences with complete indifference
between two or more candidates: the extended impartial culture (EIC). Note
that for selected values of the parameters in the EIC and IWOCmodels, the
IC model is easily found. Also, we can easily find the IWOC model from
EIC. As it can be seen, these extensions are only refinements of IC that tend
to take into account the remarks of Bjurulf (1972) and Jones et al. (1995)
according to which admitting the possibility of having weak orders rather
than strict orders wouldmake preferencesmore realistic andwould greatly
reduce the probability of certain events such as the Condorcet paradox.
The Dual Culture Model
The dual culture (DC) model was first introduced by Gehrlein (1978) in the
literature of social choice theory and operates as the IC model but it was
only defined for the framework of strict rankings. Under DC, the probabil-
ity that a given individual chooses his/her preference is the same as that
6 Recall that the normal distribution is the most common type of distribution assumed in
probabilistic analyses. The standard normal distribution has two parameters (the mean and
the standard deviation) and has themain following properties: i) Themean,mode andmedian
are all equal. ii) The curve is symmetric at the center (i.e., around the mean). iii) Exactly half
of the values are to the left of center and exactly half the values are to the right. iv) The total
area under the curve is 1.
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 10(2): 279-308
| Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation 289
of a voter with the inverted (dual) ranking. Let us illustrate this with the
preferences of Table 1. In this table, the rankings abc and cba, acb and bca,
bac and cab are dual; so, the distribution is defined as follows:
Prob(abc) = Prob(cba) = p1
Prob(acb) = Prob(bca) = p2
Prob(bac) = Prob(cab) =
1
2
− p1 − p2
Onemay notice in this case that we recover the ICmodel when p1 = p2 = 16 .
The Impartial and Anonymous Culture Model
The impartial and anonymous culture (IAC) model was introduced for the
first time in the literature of social choice theory by Gehrlein and Fishburn
(1976) and Kuga and Nagatani (1974). Under this model it is assumed that
all voting situations are equally likely to be observed, then the probability
of a given event is calculated according to the ratio between the number of
voting situations inwhich the event occurs and the total number of possible
voting situations. The possibility of computing the probability of an event
as a ratio is not specific to IAC: with IC, the probability is the ratio between
the number of preference profiles in which the event occurs and the total
number of possible preference profiles. Both models are based on a notion
of equiprobability, but the elementary events are preference profiles under
IC and voting situations under IAC. Notice that the IAC model allows to
obtain closed form representations and this is one of its main advantages
compared to the IC model. The probability of getting a given voting situa-
tion ñwith n voters andm candidates is given as follows:
Prob(ñ) = n!(m!− 1)!
(n+m!− 1)!
(2)
Under the IAC model, the number of voting situations associated with a
given event can also be reduced to the solutions of a finite system of linear
constraintswith rational coefficients. For instances, using the labels of Table
1, the number of voting situations associated with the Condorcet paradox
(of the type a is majority preferred to b, b is majority preferred to c, and c is
majority preferred to a) is reduced to the solutions of the following system:7
n1 + n2 + n5 > n3 + n4 + n6 (a is majority preferred to b)
n1 + n3 + n4 > n2 + n5 + n6 (b is majority preferred to c)
n4 + n5 + n6 > n1 + n2 + n3 (c is majority preferred to a)
ni ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , 6∑6
i=1 ni = n
(3)
7 The second possible cycle is defined in the same way using the symmetry of the IAC
assumption with respect to candidates.
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Different techniques and algorithms for finding exact theoretical solu-
tions for such systems have been proposed in the literature; the reader may
refer to the works of Cervone et al. (2005); El Ouafdi et al. (2020); Gehrlein
and Lepelley (2011); Lepelley et al. (2008) andWilson and Pritchard (2007).
The Maximal Culture Model
The maximal culture (MC) model is due to Fishburn and Gehrlein (1977).
MC is quite similar to IAC with the exception that there is no need to fix
the number of voters in the random voting situation. It fixes an integer L
(L > 0) and each ranking is drawn from a uniformly random distribution
over [0, L]. According to this, for three-candidate elections, the number of
possible equally likely voting situations is equal to (L+1)6 and the expected
number of voters in a voting situation is given by 3L.
The Urn Model: The Pólya-Eggenberger Model
According to Berg (1985a,b) and Berg and Bjurulf (1983), the IC and IAC
models are in fact only two special cases of the more general Pólya-Eggen-
berger model; this is not the case for the MC model. This model was in-
troduced into the social choice literature by Berg (1985a).8 In this model,
everything happens as if from an urn containingB balls includingBj balls
of color j (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m!), where each individual involved in the collective
decision process chooses his/her preference by means of a random draw
of a ball in the urn, and at each draw, α balls of the same color as the one
drawn by the individual are added into the urn. The quantitiesB and α are
assumed to be positive real numbers. So, the probability of getting a given












i=0 (B + iα) is a generalized ascending factorial and the
Bj are positive numbers associatedwith each order such thatB =
∑m!
j=1Bj .
According to Berg and Bjurulf (1983), α is a parameter measuring the
level of social cohesion: the larger it is, the more the preferences of the
individuals tend to be homogeneous. Berg and Bjurulf (1983) showed that
if we fix Bj = 1 for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m!, the Pólya-Eggenberger model leads
to the IC model for α = 0 and to the IAC model for α = 1. Compared
to the IC and IAC models, the Pólya-Eggenberger model therefore has the
advantage of taking into account all possible degrees of interdependence
in the preferences that individuals adopt.
Table 2 reports the limit probability, i.e., when the number of voters
tends to infinity, of the Condorcet paradox in three-candidate elections ob-
8 The reader may refer to Johnson and Kotz (1977) for an overview of this model.
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tained under each of the above theoretical models. All these results are
drawn from Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011, 2017).
Table 2: Limiting probability of the Condorcet paradox in three-candidate
elections
















The different models that we have just presented have governedmost of
the theoretical analyses and have been used to develop the probability rep-
resentations of electoral events in particular for three-candidate elections.
Despite the fact that for the same event, the models can lead to different
probabilities, Gehrlein and Lepelley (2004) put forward a certain number
of arguments to justify the use of such models. Let us summarize these
arguments:
• It can be useful to find out if the relative probabilities of paradoxical
outcomes on various voting mechanisms behave in a consistent fash-
ion over a number of different assumptions about the likelihood that
voting situations or voter preference profiles are observed.
• With real elections, large amounts of empirical data are not available;
the use of theoretical models is thus found to be very useful.
• Despite the fact that they are generally believed to represent situations
that exaggerate the probability that paradoxical events will occur, the
theoretical models can show that some paradoxical events are very
unlikely to be observed in reality.
• Theoreticalmodels can show the relative impact that paradoxical events
can have on different types of voting situations.
• By using probability models to obtain closed form representations,
it is easy to observe the impact of varying different parameters (e.g.,
parameters of specific measures of social homogeneity or group co-
herence) of voting situations or voter preference profiles; this is some-
what more difficult to do with simulation studies.
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• The obtainedprobability representations are directly reproducible and
verifiable with mathematical analysis, which is not as simple to do
with simulation analysis.
The last two arguments express themain advantages of theoreticalmod-
els on approaches based on simulations. However, wemust also admit that
very early on (and continue to do so even today, despite the increase in com-
puter processing power) the analytical approach has shown its limits when
trying to explore situations with more than three candidates. Thus, along-
side the analytical approach, manyworks have been developed on the basis
of simulations based on the a priori theoretical hypotheses that we have just
presented.
2.2 Theoretical-Based Simulations
Initially, the studies of voting situations involved only two or three candi-
dates and were limited to a finite or a very small number of agents. This is
due to the fact that the analytical calculations, which were done by hand,
rapidly became complicated and indeed unmanageable or untractable. As
mentioned before, one way to overcome the constraints and limits of the
analytical approach would be to operate on real data; however, these are
difficult to access, or rarely available. Even if they are available, the reliabil-
ity of expressed preferences may be questioned, and there is no guarantee
that the voters interviewedwill all be able to really express their preferences
when the number of candidates is large. To circumvent this obstacle, sev-
eral authors quickly opted for the assistance of computer science through
simulations. Over time, simulations have come to be no longer confined to
the subfields of economics, and are spreading to almost all social sciences
(see, for instance, Axelrod, 1997; Fontana, 2006). The principle of simula-
tion, in the common sense of the term, is to use a model, that is to say an
abstract representation of a system or a problem, and to study the evolution
of this model without operating the actual system.
In their first usage in social choice theory, the applications of the simu-
lations focused for the most part on the evaluation of the probability of the
Condorcet paradox. Among these applications, without being exhaustive,
are the works of Campbell and Tullock (1965); DeMeyer and Plott (1970);
Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976); Klahr (1966) andWeisberg and Niemi (1978,
1973); most of these works involve only strict orders for agent preferences.
According to Jones et al. (1995) this could be justified by the performance of
computers at that time. Taking advantage of the computer advances of the
90s, Jones et al. (1995) conducted an analysis of the simulated probability
of the Condorcet paradox when weak preferences are allowed.
The simulations are made assuming a certain distribution a priori on
the preferences of individuals, i.e., recourse to one of the theoretical mod-
els presented earlier. Once the distribution is chosen, the preferences are
generated using the Monte Carlo simulation method, which is a method
of estimating a numerical quantity that uses random numbers. Note that
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this method was introduced by Ulam and Von Neumann (1945), referring
to games of chance in casinos, during theManhattan project.9 This method
has the advantage of being easy to use. It is now applied to a very wide
range of problems. Let us briefly present the methodology of Monte Carlo
simulations under IC and IAC models as they are carried out as part of the
aggregation of preferences for generating samples of (linear) preferences.
For our presentation, we will focus on cases where only strict preferences
are allowed and we will use the notation of Section 1.3.
Simulations under IC
The goal is to generate, equiprobably, a profile of total orders with n vot-
ers and m candidates. So each of the m! possible total orders is chosen
equiprobably; to choose a total order is therefore equivalent to choose an
integer between 1 and m!. An integer is chosen over this interval for each
of the voters, one after the other and independently. The chance of occur-




)n. At the end of the
process, which is anonymous, we count the number of voters assigned to
each strict order; we then obtain a m!-uple of integers whose sum is equal
to n. Concretely, the routine used is the following:
• We start from the profile (0, 0, . . . , 0) which is a null vector with m!
components.
• Fromstep 1 (voter 1) to step n (votern), an integer of 1 tom! is equiprob-
ably selected. If the result is j, add 1 to the component j of the profile.
• At the nth stage, the profile is indeed am!-uple of integers whose sum
is equal to n.
To generate a sample of size T (number of repetitions), we run the previ-
ous routine T times while keeping the result; this gives a T -tuple of profiles
with total orders.
Simulations under IAC
Given the m! possible strict orders, the objective is to generate the voting
situations (anonymous profiles) equiprobably. As a reminder, a voting situ-
ation is anm!-uple (n1, n2, . . . , nm!) of natural numbers whose sum is equal
to n for which it will be necessary to randomly generate each of the com-
ponents. To do this, m! − 1 numbers are generated equiprobably in [0; 1]
which we rank in increasing order, say x1, x2, . . . , xm!−1; this series will be
completed by 0 the smallest possible value and 1 the largest possible value
such that 0 = x0, x1, x2, . . . , xm!−1, xm! = 1. Then, the value n(xj −xj−1) is
assigned to nj (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m!) that is to say n(x1 − x0) is assigned to n1,
n(x2 − x1) to n2 and so on until n(xm! − xm!−1) which is assigned to nm!.
Note that the values obtainedmay not be integers; they are then rounded to
9 Project Manhattan is the code name for the research project that produced the first atomic
bomb during the Second World War.
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the lower unit. After rounding, if the sum of the numbers thus assigned is
less than n, the difference observed will be added randomly and equiprob-
ably to one of the components. By this process, voting situations have the
same chances of being observed. To generate a sample of size T , we run the
previous routine T times.
It is worth noting that Feix and Rouet (2005) showed that there is a
connection between the probability models (IC and IAC) and probabilis-
tic models or distributions that are widely used in physics, particularly
in quantum mechanics and statistical physics: the IC model is linked to
Maxwell-Boltzmanndistribution10 and the IACmodel is related to the Bose-
Einstein statistic;11 quantum statistics would thus be another gateway for
calculating the probabilities of voting events. Feix and Rouet (2005) com-
plete their analysis by simulating the probabilities of existence of the Con-
dorcet winner under IC and IACwith a number of candidates ranging from
3 to 8 and electorates of infinite size. Their calculations show a certain con-
vergence between IC and IAC when the number of candidates increases.
Table 3 reports the likelihood of the Condorcet paradox when preferences
are simulated according to the IC and IACmodels for voting situationswith
three to eight candidates.12 The values in this table are derived from those
of Table 4 and 5 by Feix and Rouet (2005).
Table 3: Limiting probabilities of the Condorcet paradox obtained by sim-
ulations under IC and IAC
Number of candidates
Models 3 4 5 6 7 8
IC 0.0877 0.1756 0.2513 0.3152 0.3694 0.4140
IAC 0.0624 0.1616 0.2477 0.3143 0.3691 0.4170
Other simulation results on the likelihood of the Condorcet paradox
with a given number of candidates and a given number of voters, are avail-
able in the literature not only under the IC and IAC models but also for
many other assumptions; for an overview, the reader may refer to the pa-
pers of Fishburn and Gehrlein (1982); Gehrlein (1997); Jones et al. (1995);
Pomeranz and Weil (1970) and Weisberg and Niemi (1978). It comes from
10 The Maxwell-Boltzmann statistic is a probability law or distribution used in statistical
physics (thermal equilibrium) to determine the distribution of particles between different en-
ergy states.
11 It describes one of two possible ways in which a collection of non-interacting, indistin-
guishable particles may occupy a set of available discrete energy states at thermodynamic
equilibrium.
12 These figures are consistent with those obtained under the IC model by Gehrlein (1985);
Klahr (1966); Niemi and Weisberg (1968) and Weisberg and Niemi (1978).
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all these results that the probability of the Condorcet paradox tends to in-
crease with the number of candidates and the number of voters. The liter-
ature is now full of numerous probabilities of various electoral events, ob-
tained by simulations of the IC and IACmodels. See for instance, the works
of Aleskerov et al. (2012); Brandt et al. (2016); Diss andDoghmi (2016); Kelly
(1993), Lepelley et al. (2000) and others. Notice that, based on a number of
probabilistic models,13 Laslier (2010) simulated the frequency of the exis-
tence of a Condorcet winner, for several profile sizes and also the likelihood
of the election of the Condorcet winner, when he/she exists, for several vot-
ing rules. It comes from the simulation results that thewaywe should judge
voting rules depends also on the context (political election, aggregation of
judgments, jury, etc.) and the right model could depend on the type of
collective decision problem under consideration.
It should be noted that in the days of the first simulation work in the
theory of social choice, computer workstations were almost non-existent
or at least expensive; access to mainframes was even more so. Thus, the
simulations, which for the most part were confined to the probability of
the Condorcet paradox, were limited to voting situations with three candi-
dates and a very small number of voters. With more than a certain number
of voters, the calculations were time consuming and the results were based
on samples generated from a low number of repeats; this therefore casts
doubt on the accuracy of the results. With the development of mathemati-
cal, statistical and computer techniques, over time, many (more or less com-
plex) programming languages have been developed, as well as software
and toolkits that meet the particular needs of the simulation, particularly
for generating samples of preferences. Today, easily accessible Microsoft
Excel spreadsheets offer many possibilities for simulations using simple
macros and VBA language. We can also turn to more advanced tools such
asMaple,MATLAB orMathematica based on sharp programming languages
more or less comprehensible only for insiders. This development of meth-
ods and techniques today makes available to researchers “turnkey” kits to
effectively conduct their simulations that today can be done on personal
computers or on dedicated servers, or even on supercomputers (Macal and
North, 2010). The saving of time is remarkable and the accuracy of the ob-
tained results is indisputable. The advancesmade in current computer sim-
ulation techniques have made it possible to correct or refine several theo-
retical results obtained in the past.
As it is the case for the analytical approach which aims to obtain exact
results describing the theoretical probabilities of the studied voting events,
the simulation approach is strongly criticized. According to Tideman and
Plassmann (2013), the analysis and consequently the results assume fre-
13 Among others, Rousseauist cultures, impartial culture, distributives cultures and spatial
Euclidian cultures. Rousseauist cultures are adapted from Rousseau’s ideal of a general will.
Distributive cultures describe societies of complete antagonism with a context comparable to
that which governs the problems where a unit of a divisible good has to be shared between
individuals. Spatial Euclidian cultures are consistent with what we present in Section 3.1.
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quency distributions chosen just because of the convenient mathematical
properties, while these distributions are far from reflectingwhat is happen-
ing in real elections. In fact, there is no evidence that voters’ choices obey
any probabilistic distribution, let alone a uniform distribution. On the ba-
sis of their criticisms of theoretical models, several authors have argued for
simulations based on more realistic distributions and assumptions.
3 Other Approaches of Agent-Based Modeling
and Simulation Models
Besides the models that have just been discussed, two other approaches
emerge: spatial voting models and models inspired by psychology. The
modeling under these approaches seeks not to assume a certain behavior of
voters but to determine a distribution of preferences that is closest to reality.
More exactly, these approaches have the common feature of analyzing and
generating preferences so as to reflect or to come close to real elections’ data
samples.
3.1 The Spatial Voting Models
Spatial voting models were first applied specifically to elections by Downs
(1957) to study the relative positioning of political parties and voters using
a spatial approach built on the pioneering work of Black (1948); Hotelling
(1929); Lerner and Singer (1937); Smithies (1941) and Greenhut (1956), who
addressed the problem of location between two competing firms in order
to optimally choose their setting in a market of undifferentiated goods. Un-
der a spatialmodel, it is assumed that both candidates and voters are placed
in an unidimensional or multidimensional space according to the position
they take or prefer on certain issues, each of which corresponds to a dimen-
sion. In such a setting, a voter tends to choose the candidate who is closest
to his/her position while a candidate will tend to choose a position that
maximizes the number of electoral votes.
Let us notice that themost basic spatialmodel inspired byDowns (1957),
involves an election based on a single dimension under which candidates
can be ordered on a left-right axis, such that for each voter, his/her util-
ity is decreasing with the distance to his/her preferred alternatives along
this axis. Given his/her location (i.e., ideal or bliss point) and knowing
the locations of the candidates on the spectrum, each voter casts a vote for
the candidate who is closest to his/her location. The locations of the vot-
ers along the line follow a specific distribution and the Euclidean distance
serves as a tool for measuring the elector-candidate proximity. For a given
voter i and party or candidate j, if we denote by vi the voter’s position and
by pij the party’s position as perceived by voter i, the Downsian utility (Uij)
of voter i is given by:
Uij = −α× (vi − pij)2 (5)
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In Eq. 5, the overall policy importance is captured through the parameter
α.
Besides the Downsian-inspired model, we note the existence of the so-
called directional models. Under the directional model developed by Rabi-
nowitz and Macdonald (1989),14 it is assumed that utilities are determined
by both the intensity and communality of direction of voters’ and candi-
dates’ positions. So, voters have a diffuse preference for certain direction
on an issue but vary in the intensity with which they hold that preference.
Under this model, the voter’s utility is a product of the policy positions of
the voter i and the party j:
Uij = α× vi × pij (6)
We owe to Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) the introduction of a mixed
model that combines the directional and theDownsian logic: a voter’s choice
is determined both by a proxy of proximity and by a directional component.
A voter’s utility under this model is defined as follows:
Uij = α×
(
− β(vi − pij)2 + (1− β)vipij
)
(7)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a relative weight of the two components of voter utility.
As one can see, when parameter β is equal to 1, we get theDownsianmodel;
when β = 0, we get the directional model. More recently, Kedar (2005) in-
troduced amodel combining the Downsian approachwith a compensatory
component which captures the outcome orientation of the voters. Accord-
ing to Kedar (2005), when a voter is outcome-oriented, it is assumed that
he/she compares the expected policy outcome P if all parties are elected
and a counterfactual policy outcome P−pj where one party pj is excluded
from the policy process P ; then, he/she will choose the party where the
distance between the two scenarios is greatest, providing the party shifts
the expected policy outcome in the desired direction. Under the compen-
sational model, a voter’s utility is defined as follows:
Uij = α
(
− β(vi − pij)2 − (1− β)[(vi − P )2 − (vi − P−pj )2]
)
+ δjzi (8)
where, given pj the position of party and sj ∈ [0, 1] the relative impact of
party j such that
∑
j sj = 1; P =
∑
j sjpj ; δj is a vector indicating the effect
of background variables zi on voter utility for party j.
Each of the above models has been described in the one-dimensional
framework; they are easily extensible and adaptable to the multidimen-
sional framework. However, in the multidimensional framework, resort-
ing to Euclidean distances requires assumptions about agent preferences.
These hypotheses are, for the most part, improbable and empirically un-
realistic; worse, they can complicate the theoretical analyses (Enelow and
Hinich, 1990). Hence the use of models based on simulations. So, utiliz-
ing data from real elections, many variations of spatial models have been
14 Please refer to Merrill and Grofman (1999) for an overview of all the so-called directional
models.
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used to test theoretical results and also to show how institutional context
affects voter behavior. The reader may refer, for instance, the work of Mer-
rill (1984); Plassmann and Tideman (2011); Tideman (1992) and Tideman
and Plassmann (2013).
3.2 The Behavioral Social Choice Approach
Popularized by Regenwetter et al. (2006), behavioral social choice is the coun-
terpart of the traditional social choice theorywhich integrates into the anal-
ysis some realistic psychological factors (limited rationality, cognitive bi-
ases, etc.) that can influence individuals’s choices in a real world. A be-
havioral approach usually tries to confront “what should be” (the norma-
tive aspect) with “what is” (the empirical aspect). So, behavioral social
choice compares how supposedly rational individuals should make their
decisions with how real decision makers behave empirically. It provides
a framework for crafting more realistic models of social choice by embed-
ding social choice analysis into a psychological representation of prefer-
ences and choice behavior, alongside a statistical evaluation of these mod-
els against empirical data (see for instance, Regenwetter andGrofman, 1998;
Regenwetter et al., 2002a,b; Tsetlin and Regenwetter, 2003); it also develops
methodologies to (re)construct preference distribution from incomplete data
(Regenwetter et al., 2006).
Behavioral social choice challenges the analyses carried out in social
choice theory based on a priori assumptions on the distribution of agents’
preferences. The group of authors behind behavioral social choice support
the idea that the results obtained from the theoretical models are highly de-
pendent on the a priori assumptions considered in generating elections sce-
narios; these hypotheses, by restricting the behavior of individuals to prob-
abilistic distributions (normal law), are themselves very far from reflecting
the behavior of individuals in the real world. Thus, the results of the the-
oretical models based on a priori assumptions tend to promote views that
are too pessimistic regarding the probability of many voting events such
as the Condorcet paradox. According to Popova et al. (2013), these results
may magnify gloomy predictions found in the axiomatic literature on the
inability of an electorate to make a group decision.
Behavioral social choice aims to empirically analyze the rules or meth-
ods of preference aggregation by abstracting useless and/or unsubstanti-
ated assumptions about human behavior. It turns out, therefore, that for
any analysis, one has to state, very explicitly, tested and validated hypothe-
ses about human behavior. Behavioral social choice considers empirical
data on social choice from an inferential statistical point of view. If the em-
pirical data are considered as imperfect and incomplete reflections of the
voters’ preference, one must evaluate the replicability of social choice out-
comes and assess to what extent one can be confident about the search for
correct collective outcomes. Thus, under each behavioral model, the maxi-
mum likelihood estimate is used to calculate the probabilities of the voting
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events, and statistical confidence levels are generated through a nonpara-
metric bootstrap (Efron, 1979).
Generally speaking, the main idea behind a bootstrap is to make, on
sample data, inferences about an estimate of sample statistics (samplemean,
standard deviation, etc.) for a population statistical parameters (its mean,
its standard deviation, etc.). Concretely, going from a data sample of size
N with complete or incomplete voters’ preference from real elections, it
proceeds by carrying out sampling with replacement: a sample of size N
is independently drawn from the original sample with replacement and
replicated T times. For each of the T bootstrap samples, the estimates of
the population parameters are evaluated; then a sampling distribution is
built with all these estimates and used for the statistical inference. Ideally,
it would be nice if T were large enough to ensure meaningful statistics; this
is generally possible when using Monte Carlo simulations on fairly power-
ful computers by generating random samples.
In a behavioral social choice context, a bootstrap appears as a computer-
based method for statistical inference that, without relying on too many as-
sumptions, is a way of simulating possible sources of uncertainty15 in the
results. It assesses how the results would be affected by small disturbances
in the distribution of votes (preferences) and helps infer confidence levels
about at which point estimates of model parameters would not be affected
by such disturbances. Using this inference approach of preference aggre-
gation, Regenwetter et al. (2006) and related papers have established the
robustness of the empirical absence of majority cycles for a wide range of
realistic modeling assumptions. They also came to the conclusion that the
theoretical assumption quite often used in the literature give a pessimistic
view, assigning high probabilities to the existence of electoral paradoxes,
and indeed considering them as virtually certain when in fact in the real
world this is not the case.
Concluding Remarks
Over time, simulation models have emerged as an indispensable tool in
many disciplines and fields of study. They offer a way to overcome the
limits or constraints of theoretical modeling. In social choice theory, simu-
lations quickly found their place as a way of dealing with the complexity
of the topic and the challenges of the modeling of human behavior in a
decision-making framework. They appear as a springboard allowing us
to complete the analyses carried out in theoretical approach, or at least
to question them. The models developed in theoretical work have shown
some limitswhen it comes tomodeling the behavior of individuals involved
in a process of collective decision: models can become intractable; and in-
15 According to Regenwetter et al. (2002b, 2006) uncertainty can come from various factors,
such as voters’ uncertainty about their preference, unreliability of voter turnout, counting of
ballots, etc.
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deed, given certain parameter values (number of agents, number of alter-
natives, etc.) some analyses are almost impossible. Moreover, the results
obtained depend strongly on the assumptions on the behavior of the agents
that support the models. It is also true that these assumptions are deemed
relevant to a universe that is actually very far from reality.
Since social choice theory has been one of the areas in economics that
has seen a boom in work using models based on the behavior of individ-
uals involved in collective decision-making, the purpose of this paper has
been to offer to the uninitiated in the social choice theory, a methodological
presentation of some well-known models and the techniques of theoretical
calculations and simulations, and then to report on recent developments of
new models and advances in calculation techniques and simulations.
After briefly presenting the general framework of the aggregation of
preferences, wepresented themostwidespread theoreticalmodels and their
extensions, and then discussed their strengths and weaknesses. We have
particularly emphasized the two models that are most prevalent in the lit-
erature: themodel of impartial culture (IC) and that of impartial and anony-
mous culture (IAC). The ICmodel, introduced by Guilbaud (1952), is based
on the idea that all preference profiles are equiprobable and that each in-
dividual chooses his/her preference in a uniform probability distribution.
For instance, when the individual preferences are expressed as linear orders
on a set of alternatives, the IC assumption indicates that the preference rela-
tion of each voter is drawn uniformly at random from the set of all possible
linear orders. On the other hand, the IAC model, introduced by Gehrlein
and Fishburn (1976) and Kuga and Nagatani (1974), assumes the equiprob-
ability of voting situations. Most theoretical results are based on these two
models. Since these models are special cases of the multinomial law, one
of their limitations lies in the fact that even for a limited number of alter-
natives and individuals, the multinomial law becomes difficult to manage.
Indeed, we have shown how simulation models (notably with the Monte
Carlo method) developed under these models may be helpful in analyzing
complex problems in social choice theory; they havemade it possible to val-
idate or invalidate several results established in the literature. In short, the
simulations implemented under these assumptions have helped to produce
well-known and robust results in the field of preference aggregation.
The theoretical modeling has been strongly criticized for being based on
distributions that do not reflect what happens in real elections; in fact, there
is no evidence that voters’ choices obey any probabilistic distribution, and
no work has ever supported or even established that the theoretical models
reflect the reality in a particular situation. These criticisms gave rise to the
emergence ofmodelling that is not built on a priori assumptions on the pref-
erences of agents. In this paper, we have presented two approaches that fall
within this framework: spatial voting models and behavioral social choice.
Under spatial voting models, inspired by Downs (1957), it is assumed that
both candidates and voters are placed in a unidimensional or multidimen-
sional space according to the position they take or prefer on certain issues,
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each ofwhich corresponds to a dimension. In such a setting, a voter tends to
choose the candidate who is closest to his/her position, while a candidate
will tend to choose a position that maximizes the number of electoral votes.
According to Merrill (1984); Plassmann and Tideman (2011) and Tideman
and Plassmann (2013), when generating candidates and voters by means of
simulations based on a spatial model, outcomes come astonishingly close
to describing the distribution of actual outcomes, and ranking data sim-
ulated with the spatial model are very similar to observed ranking data.
The spatial-model results thus tend to be more realistic. Behavioral social
choice, popularized by the book of Regenwetter et al. (2006), provides a
framework for craftingmore realistic models of social choice by embedding
social choice analysis into a psychological representation of preferences and
choice behavior, and a statistical evaluation of these models against empir-
ical data; it also develops methodologies to (re)construct preference distri-
butions from incomplete data. Contrary to the theoretical models, these
two approaches describe a modeling in which one confronts “what must
be” with “what is”, the goal being to get as close as possible to what hap-
pens in real situations of collective decision. Practice has shown that the
developed models perform well in this task.
Remarkable advances in computer science andmathematical and statis-
tical calculation techniques are giving more and more prominence to sim-
ulations. This suggests that new opportunities are opening to theorists to
refine the results found in the literature, but also to revisit certain problems
whose resolution was previously impossible.
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